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INTERPRETATIONS OF MIRANDA RULES

GOVERNING INTERROGATIONS
AND CONFESSIONS

In People v. Garcia, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Ct. App.
1969), the court considered whether Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), required that its
warnings be given prior to and as a part of the
medical examination required by a California
statute for the commitment of narcotic addicts.
The defendant was committed to a state rehabilitation center after being adjudged a narcotic
drug addict in a civil proceeding under this statute.
He argued that the commitment order must be
reversed because the warnings required by Miranda
were not given in conjunction with the medical
examination.
The court emphasized that the Miranda requirements apply equally to police officers who are
attempting to apprehend and obtain commitment
of narcotic addicts and those who attempt to
apprehend and obtain conviction of criminal
offenders. The court concluded, however, that
there was a distinction between interrogation by a
police officer and interrogation by one other than
a police officer, and held that the Miranda rules do
not apply to interrogation by a physician conducted solely as a part of a statutorily required
medical examination designed to determine medical
facts as a basis for a treatment program. The
court pointed out that this is not a case where the
physician was an agent of the prosecution and that
an examination to determine addiction or imminent danger of addiction is of a nature that cannot be conducted intelligently without interrogation on matters likely to be incriminating. For
these reasons the court concluded that the evils
which the Mirandarules were designed to eliminate
did not exist in this type of examination and the
warnings were thus not required.
In Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.

Richard P. Vogehnan
1968), the court considered the applicability of the
Miranda rules to investigations by Internal
Revenue Service agents of taxpayers not in
custody. Cohen had numerous meetings with a
Special Agent who was investigating his failure to
file tax returns. Cohen was never given the full
Miranda warnings and was not advised that the
Special Agent was a criminal investigator until
after participating in many meetings.
The Circuit Court faced the question of whether
or not a Special Agent conducting a pre-custody
inquiry must give the Mirandawarnings when the
inquiry reaches the accusatory stage. It rejected
the position taken by some district courts that the
warnings are required at the point where the investigation reaches the accusatory stage or becomes criminally oriented, even though there is no
custodial interrogation. The court reasoned that
it was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation and not the strength of the government's
suspicion at the time of the questioning which led
to the imposition of the Miranda requirements.
Thus the presence or absence of compelling pressures, rather than the stage of the investigation,
determines in a particular instance whether the
Miranda requirements apply.
The court explicitly rejected the suggestion
that the Miranda warnings should be required at
the point where a Special Agent, a criminal investigator, takes over from the Revenue Agent;
in other words, the court would not have the title
and function of the investigator determine when
the right to the warnings attaches. The court also
rejected the suggestion that the warnings be
optional with the Internal Revenue Service, depending upon whether there is a desire to preserve
the right to use evidence obtained in a criminal
prosecution. It felt this procedure would be meritorious if a taxpayer were entitled to the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights in a non-custodial tax
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In People v. White, 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968),
investigation, but since it concluded taxpayers are
not so entitled, the court held that Internal Revenue the Supreme Court of California indicated that the
Service agents, whether special or revenue, are not test of when a defendant is in custody is not the
required to warn taxpayers of those rights when subjective intent of the interrogator but whether
the defendant is "physically deprived of his freethey are not in custody.
In three recent cases the issue of when there is dom of action in any significant way or is led to
such custody that the Miranda warnings are ap- believe, as a reasonable man, that he is so deplicable was raised. People v. Wilson, 74 Cal. Rptr. prived". The court found custodial interrogation
131 (Ct. App. 1968), involved a defendant who despite the lack of any objective indication of
was convicted of possession of marijuana on the restraint or compulsion in the request that the
basis of evidence obtained as a result of the search defendant go to the sheriff's station. After the
of a residence. The police had a warrant authoriz- defendant was at the station, the officer with him
ing a search of the premises and its occupants, learned of evidence against him, and the court
concluded that at this time the officer would not
including the defendant. She and a companion
were in a bedroom reading when the police entered, have allowed the defendant to leave without an
identified themselves and showed a copy of the explanation of this evidence. The officer testified he
warrant. The police did not tell them they must -confronted the defendant with the incriminating
remain in the room nor did they tell them they evidence in order to allow him to make an explanawere free to leave. The police made a routine tion. The officer's first question elicited defendant's
search and found cigarette papers in a dresser. denial of ownership of a coat which, when he tried
When an officer asked the defendant if they be- it on, fitted him and in which his last name aplonged to her, she answered they did and that she peared. The court felt this was an obvious falseused them to make her own cigarettes. The officer hood which indicated the defendant realized that
also found a folded plastic container in a shopping something more than silence was expected of him
bag. When he asked the defendant what it was she and that the pressures of the situation prevented
asked to see it and, after looking inside, answered him from making a rational response. The statethat she thought it was "grass" or marijuana. Then ments which the officer then made--that the coat
the officer examined the substance and at that appeared to fit the defendant and that he believed
point placed the defendant under arrest and ad- his name was inside-were reasonably understood
by the defendant as an accusatory statement that
vised her of her rights.
The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule of produced his admission of a murder. On this basis
Miranda applies to statements stemming from the court held that the prosecution had not suscustodial interrogation; all that is required for such tained its burden of showing that the admission
interrogation to exist is that the defendant is was not the product of custodial interrogation and
"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant the statements were thus inadmissible.
State v. Heisdorger, 164 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa,
way". The court concluded the defendant was
deprived of such freedom of action because the 1969), involved a defendant convicted of operating
warrant specifically authorized a search of her a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The defendant
person as well as the premises. Thus the police was stopped when his car was observed being
would not have allowed the defendant to leave the operated in an erratic manner and striking a
area while they searched the room because, had highway guard post. A patrolman asked the dethey found nothing in the room, they were author- fendant to take some road side sobriety tests which
ized to detain her and call a female officer. Since he was unable to complete successfully. Then the
the search warrant advised the defendant of this defendant was arrested and given the Miranda
fact, the court considered it immaterial whether warnings. He was taken to the police station and
or not the officers also effectively advised her of it. again given the warnings. He requested a specific
The court also considered irrelevant the fact that attorney; this attorney was called twice and each
time refused to come to the station until morning.
there was here no process of interrogation. It
stated that Miranda simply requires custodial The defendant asked that another attorney be
interrogation; it is not necessary that a process of called. None was called, however, and the deinterrogation designed to elicit incriminating fendant was taken to the basement of the police
station where tests and interrogation were constatements actually be employed.
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tinued. An officer who was at the station testified
that the defendant did not speak lucidly and
dearly and that he volunteered the statement that
he was "awfulP' drunk. The defendant failed more
sobriety tests and refused to take chemical tests.
The court held that the testimony of the patrolman concerning the road side sobriety tests the
defendant attempted before being arrested and
before Miranda warnings were given were admissible. It reasoned that this was not a situation
which called for Miranda warnings because it was
"general on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime". The patrolman had good
cause to suspect the defendant might be guilty of
driving while intoxicated and the tests were
necessary to decide if he should be arrested. As a
second basis for sustaining the admissibility of this
evidence, the court argued that performance of
the tests was not evidence by communication and
thus requiring the defendant to furnish this evidence does not violate his privilege against selfincrimination.
The court also held that the testimony by the
officer concerning the observation of the defendant as he attempted sobriety tests at the
station after he had been given the Mirandawarnings and requested an attorney were admissible.
The court felt that even though Miranda makes it
clear that if an attorney is requested, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present, the
Miranda rules were not applicable here. These
observations of the defendant were real rather than
communicative evidence and thus outside of the
scope of the Miranda requirements.
The issue of what constitutes an effective waiver
of the right to remain silent in light of Miranda
was recently considered by the supreme courts of
Iowa and California. In State v. McClelland, 164
N.W.2d 189 (Iowa, 1969), the defendant contended that once he stated that he wished not to
answer questions, any information obtained in
later conversation, regardless of whether or not
prefaced by Miranda warnings, was inadmissible
on the grounds that it necessarily resulted from a
type of compulsion, at least in the absence of
counsel. The defendant had been given the Miranda warnings and stated he did not wish to
answer questions. But about three hours later as
he was being taken to a jail in another town, a
patrolman asked him questions about the breaking and entering charge against him at that time.
It was then the defendant made incriminating

statements which were later introduced in evidence
at his trial.
This court rejected defendant's contention,
noting that the inevitable consequences of such a
holding would be an ironclad rule prohibiting police
officers from inquiring of a defendant who has once
invoked his right to silence whether he wishes at
any time to waive that right. It was unwilling to
hold that Miranda goes so far as to exclude all
answers obtained from defendants after they have
once claimed their right to remain silent, especially
where the record shows the voluntary nature of the
response. Since the court felt the totality of the
attendant circumstances demonstrated the voluntary nature of the statements, the court held
they were admissible. In reaching this conclusion.
it pointed to a Maryland decision which, in a
similar factual situation, also held that the invocation of the right to remain silent does not bar the
admission in evidence of incriminating statements
made later, even though the testimony does not
show an express waiver of the right to remain
silent, as long as the totality of the circumstances
implicitly show that the defendant voluntarily and
intelligently relinquished that right.
There was a strong dissent in this case which
argued that the acceptance of the Maryland
standard for finding a waiver of the previously
exercised right to remain silent, under the facts of
this case, constituted a refusal of the majority to
follow a mandate of the United States Supreme
Court on a federal constitutional issue. Here the
incriminating statements were made in response to
a question by an officer after the defendant had
been arrested and while he was on his way to jail
in a car with two officers. The dissent argued there
were no facts which pointed to an intelligent
waiver of the right to remain silent. The prosecution has the burden of proving a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Since a valid waiver cannot be
presumed from silence after the Miranda warnings
are given or from the fact that incriminating
statements are eventually obtained, to conclude
that there was here a valid waiver was to ignore the
constitutional tests.
People v. Johnson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969), involved a defendant arrested in Connecticut in
connection with a murder in California. The judge
at the extradition proceeding advised the defendant
that he was entitled to an attorney, that any
statements he made could be used against him,
and that he had a right to remain silent. When the
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necticut court had specifically advised the dejudge discovered that the defendant was under 21
and neither of his parents was present, the judge fendant of his right to an attorney.
An inquiry was also made into the motivating
appointed an attorney to act as his guardian. After
the defendant consulted with the attorney he indi- cause of the defendant's confession. A promise of
cated he had been advised and understood the leniency, express or dearly implied, made by an
extradition proceedings and agreed to return officer is a sufficient cause to invalidate a convoluntarily to California. After he was returned, fession if it is a motivating cause of the confesthe defendant was interrogated at various times. sion. The court felt that the exhortation of the
At first he made no incriminating statements but defendant by the officers to tell the truth was more
later admitted involvement in the plan to commit a than merely pointing out to him that which flows
robbery which resulted in the shooting, although naturally from a truthful and honest course of
he denied doing any of the shooting himself. This conduct. It carried the implication that by coconfession was the sole evidence at the trial linking operating and telling what actually happened the
defendant might not be accused of and found
the defendant to the murder.
The defendant argued that he never knowingly guilty of first degree murder while, in fact, because
and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. of the felony-murder rule, his statement that he
This court agreed. It found that the defendant was took part in the robbery attempt but not in the
advised by the court in Connecticut of his rights in shooting amounted to a confession of first degree
the extradition proceeding, that he was advised of murder. In light of these facts, the court concluded
his right to counsel, to silence, and regarding the that it stretched the imagination to believe the
use against him of any incriminating statements he defendant knowlingly and intelligently waived his
might make by the officers accompanying him to right to be free from self-incrimination, especially
California, and that he was advised six more times since there were no other circumstances to show
before he made the incriminating statements. The the defendant was aware of his constitutional
court found it significant, however, that the advice rights.
given by the court in Connecticut was not pertinent
WmETPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
to the pending criminal charges in California and
could not serve as warnings therein; nevertheless
In Desist v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969),
it was used "as a sort of lodestone" by the officers the defendants were convicted in the United States
in later giving warnings to the defendant.
District Court for the Southern District of New
The court reasoned that the determination of York of conspiring to import and conceal heroin in
whether there has been an intelligent waiver de- violation of the federal narcotic law. On remand
pends on the particular facts and circumstances from the court of appeals, the district court found
surrounding the case, including the background, no violation of constitutional rights by governexperience, and conduct of the accused. Since the ment's use of electronic equipment. In Kaiser v.
accusatory stage had been reached, the defendant New York, 89 S. Ct. 1044 (1969), the defendant
was entitled to the assistance of counsel and to the was convicted of attempted extortion and conright of freedom from self-incrimination. Knowl- spiracy to commit extortion in a New York trial
edge of these rights and an intelligent understand- court. The case for the prosecution rested princiing of them must be proven by the People in order pally on the content of two telephone conversations
to make the defendant's incriminating statements between the petitioner and one of his co-conadmissible.
spirators. Both cases were upheld by the Supreme
The court noted that while the officers taped the Court.
defendant's statements, they did not record a
In Desist,an important part of the Government's
waiver by him, an acknowledgement that he had evidence consisted of tape recordings of conversabeen given the warnings, or any affirmative state- tions among several of the petitioners in a New
ment that he understood them. The court also York city hotel room. The tapes were made by
noted that the officers proceeded with their inter- federal officers in the adjoining room by means of
rogation in spite of the fact that the defendant was an electronic recording which did not physically
without counsel to advise him and that the officer intrude into the defendants' room. The latter fact
placed great reliance on the fact 'that the Con- caused the district court and the court of appeals
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to conclude no "trespass" or "actual intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area". The defendants
argued that their rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence
used against defendants was not tainted by any
invasion of their constitutional rights. The Court
noted that since every electronic eavesdropping
upon private conversations is a search or seizure, it
can comply with constitutional standards only
when authorized by a neutral magistrate upon a
showing of probable cause and under precise
limitations and appropriate safeguards. Katz v.
United States, 88 S. Ct. 507, at 511. The eavesdropping in this case was not carried out pursuant
to such a warrant. However, Katz was given
wholly prospective application. In sum, the
Supreme Court held that "Katz is to be applied
only to cases in which the prosecution seeks to
introduce the fruits of electronic surveillance conducted after December 18, 1967. Since the eavesdropping in this case occurred before that date,
and was consistent with pre-Katz decisions of this
court, the convictions must be affirmed."
In Kaiser, tapes and transcripts of telephone
conversations were introduced at the trial over the
petitioner's objection that they had been obtained
by an unlawful wiretap. The conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of New York and
by the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and rejected petitioner's
contention that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. This decision simply
reiterated the decision in Desist wherein it was held
that Katz is to be applied wholly prospectively.
Justice Fortas dissented (89 S. Ct. 1048) from
the Desist and Kaiser decisions. He states that the
effect of these two decisions is to grant "absolution
to police invasions of individual privacy by wiretap and electronic devices, not involving physical
trespass, as long as the unconstitutional conduct
took place before Katz". Justice Fortas defines the
issue as "whether because in Katz we formally
announced that the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure,
persons claiming the benefit of this principle prior
to that date must be denied its protection". In
other words, Katz is here being used to deny the
rights it sought to uphold.

In Alderman v. United States; Ivanov v. United
States, and Butenko v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 961
(1969), petitioner Alderman was convicted for
conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce, and petitioners, Ivanov and
Butenko, were convicted of conspiring to transmit
to the Soviet Union information relating to the
national defense of the United States. All convictions were affirmed by the courts of appeal, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The issue
presented for appeal was whether any of the
government's evidence supporting conviction was
the product of illegal surveillance to which any of
the petitioners were entitled to object.
The court noted that any evidence seized
in violation of Fourth Amendment rights is excluded from a criminal trial, and that oral statements, if illegally overheard, and their fruits, are
also subject to suppression.
In these cases, therefore, any petitioner would be
entitled to suppression of government evidence
originating in electronic surveillance violative of his
own Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Such violation
would occur if the United States unlawfully overheard conversations of a petitioner or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not he
was present or participated in those conversations.
This right to be secure in one's house is not
limited to protection against a policeman viewing
or seizing tangible property. The rights of the
owner of the premises are as clearly invaded when
the police enter and install a listening device in
his house. Finally, to determine whether evidence
grew out of illegally overheard conversations, the
test is whether evidence has been secured by
exploitation of the illegality.
The Court here resolved the issue whether evidence against any defendant grew out of illegally
overheard conversations by permitting the defendant to have access to the surveillance records
as to which a particular defendent has standing to
object. In this respect, the Supreme Court conludes, "trial courts in compelling disclosure to
defendants of records of electronic surveillance
can and should place defendant" under orders
against unwarranted disclosure of materials which
defendant is allowed to inspect.
In United States v. White, 405 F. 2d 838 (7th
Cir.-1969), the defendant was convicted in the
United States District Court of a narcotics viola-
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tion and he appealed. The sentence appealed from
was a prison sentence of twenty-five years and a
fine of $35,000. The principal error relied upon was
the admission into the evidence of certain incriminating statements made by the defendant
which were overheard by means of electronic
eavesdropping by Government agents. This
eavesdropping was accomplished by the placing
of a radio kel set transmitter on the person of a
Government informer before he talked with the
defendant at various locations, including the
defendant's home, car, and place of business. At no
time did the agent secure a search warrant or court
order authorizing such eavesdropping.
The Government's evidence was based largely
upon oral testimony by the narcotics agents that
they overheard incriminating statements made by
the defendant to the secret informer and transmitted by the kel set device. Such information
included the price and quality of heroin in defendant's possession, statements by defendant that
he could get the "stuff", and that the supplier
"wanted his money". The central issue presented
for appeal was whether defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, protecting him against governmental
intrusion by unreasonable search and seizure, were
infringed when the Government narcotics agent
electronically intercepted his private conversations.
The criteria of Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507
(1967), were applied, and on this basis, the case
was remanded for a new trial. The court noted that
the Katz opinion stated that the Fourth Amendment is designed to preserve privacy against the
"uninvited ear" of governmental intrusion and
must be applied to "protect people, not places".
Furthermore, Katz brought conversations within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection.
Applying the facts of this case, the court of
appeals found that overtly electronically intercepted statements made in defendant's home,
automobile, and place of business were within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Such evidence
was considered "per se inadmissible evidence". To
avoid the "per se unreasonable" label, prior approval by judge or magistrate was necessary. The
court then noted that defendant did not waive his
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and since court authorization
for the federal agent's electronic eavesdropping
was lacking, "a naked violation of the defendant's
rights" existed. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial

SEARcH AN SEIzuRE
Aguilar Explicated-Spinelli v. United States,
89 S. Ct. 584 (1969): The Supreme Court has
recently attempted to explicate the principles of
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The petitioner, Spinelli, challenged the constitutionality of
a search warrant based on an affadavit of a FBI
agent which contained the following allegations:
1) During four days out of a five day surveillance,
Spinelli was seen entering a particular apartment
building. 2) A check with the telephone company
revealed that the particular apartment unit he
entered contained two phones listed under a
different name carrying the numbers WY 4-0029
and WY 4-0136. 3) Spinelli was known to the
affiant as a gambler and a bookmaker. 4) A confidential and reliable informant stated that Spinelli
was accepting wagers by means of the telephones
with numbers WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136. The
Court held that there was not probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant. Without the informant's
tip there was not sufficient information to establish
probable cause. But the tip did not meet the dual
test set down in Aguilar. Although the affiant
swore that his confidant was reliable, he offered no
reason in support of that conclusion. Nor did the
tip contain a sufficient statement of the underlying
circumstances from which the informer concluded
that Spinelli was making book. The specification
of the two phone numbers being used did not meet
the detailed description of the surrounding facts
which could have justified the issuance of a warrant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959). Nor did the other allegations of the affadavit permit the suspicions raised by the tip
to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably
being committed.
Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment of
the Court although he wondered whether the facts
of the case did not fit within the principle of
Draper. He argued that the verification of the
telephone numbers by the FBI made the informant's allegation about gambling more believable since the information verified was not
neutral, but material to proving the gambling
operation. However, he joined the majority because he doubted the soundness of the Draper
principle that because an informant is right about
some things, he is more probably right about the
critical, unverified fact. He was uncertain that the
existence of critical fact (i.e., the commission of the
crime of gambling) is made sufficiently probable
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by the verification of nine other facts coming from
the same source (i.e., the use of two telephones
with specified numbers). He argued that this
proposition is contrary to another line of cases
holding that past reliability of an officer is not
sufficient reason for believing his current assertions.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, felt that the facts
stated established probable cause. Moreover, he
argued that the Court is enmeshing itself and the
police in the technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once associated with common law pleading.

criminal responsibility when defendant offers an
insanity defense are as follows:
1. Was he suffering from a mental illness at the
time of the commission of the crime?
2. Was the illness such as to prevent his knowing the wrongfulness of his act?
3. Was the mental illness such as to render him
incapable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law he is charged with
violating?
In adopting this test, the court rejected the
"right-wrong" test of criminal responsibility as
inadequate, because it did not provide for cases
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
where mental illness deprived the person of actual
Wade-Gilbert Guidelines Applied To Pre- choice of conduct even though he did possess the
Indictment Line-Up-United States v. Kinnard, knowledge of what is right or wrong in legal or
294 F.Supp. 286 (D.C.D.C. 1968): One of the moral terms. The irresistible impulse formula was
questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court of also rejected for it did not provide for consideration
the United States when it formulated its con- of those cases of mental illness where long brooding
stitutional ruling that counsel must be present at of a person mentally ill has as compelling a result
line-ups is whether that right extends to identifica- as any sudden onset of temporary insanity.
In People v. Morrow, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1969),
tion procedures conducted prior to indictment.
the
defendant, who was convicted of assault and
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and its
battery,
raised the defense that at the time of the
companion case, Gilbert v. State of California, 388
assaults he was suffering from alcoholic blackouts
U.S. 263 (1967), in which the Court enunicated the
and was unconscious of his violent acts. The court
line-up guidelines, both involved post-indictment
line-ups. The District Court for the District of rejected the defense, holding that voluntary inColumbia answered that the language of Wade- toxication is no excuse for crime. The court did
Gilbert indicated that there was no reason to recognize that in a case involving a crime which
distinguish between procedures occurring at any requires the proof of a specific intent, a state of
time after arrest. It recognized that other courts intoxication could be weighed by the jury in
which have similarly been faced with the issue determining whether the crime was committed.
Comment: People v. Morrow involved voluntary
have come out on both sides of the fence. This
intoxication
only, and there was no consideration
court, for one, believed that the "critical stage"
of
involuntary
intoxication. There was no disfor the defendant had little to do with the time of
cussion
whether
the defendant was an alcoholic, or
the indictment. It realized, however, that it, as a
district court, would not have the final say on the whether alcoholism would be considered an illness
issue, and that since the rule "affects the daily or as involuntary intoxication. Should it be conroutine of police in every major metropolitan area", sidered a mental illness, then perhaps under the
an authoritative answer should be made soon. "A Model Penal Code definition of criminal reprotracted case-by-case refinement of the Wade sponsibility he would be considered incapable of
doctrine", the court explained, "will not serve the conforming his conduct to requirements of law he
is charged with violating.
best interests of this community".
CRrnINAL RESPONSIBILITY

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Criminal Responsibility-Insanity and Intoxication: In United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d
720 (6th Cir. 1968), the Court of Appeals adopted
the Model Penal Code test of criminal responsibility, believing that the test comported to
modem scientific knowledge. Under the test, the
questions for jury consideration pertaining to

Admissibility Of Photographs-United States v.
Hobbs, 403 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1968); Palmer v.
State, 435 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App.
1968). Both courts recognized the possible importance that photographs can have for the prosecution, while they also noted the possibility of
prejudicial effect on the jury. In Palmer, the
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Tennessee court admitted photographs of the
body of the deceased in a murder trial to show the
location and condition of the body despite defense
objection that their introduction was unnecessary
and would only arouse the emotions of the jury.
The court explained that if the pictures were
accurate representations of the scene then they
should be admitted; in this respect, the court
compared photographs to models, maps, and
plans, and, as such, admissibility is within the
discretion of the trial court. The Sixth Circuit in
Hobbs also admitted photos of a bank robbery even
though there was no evidence as to whether the
original image was transmitted through the
offered camera. The court further explained that
the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator in the photographs was a jury question.
Right To Counsel At Parole And Probation
Revocation Hearings-Commonwealth v. Tinson,
249 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1969); Gargan v. State, 217
So.2d 579 (Fla. 1969). Relying on the proposition
of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), that
counsel is required at every stage of the criminal
proceeding where substantial rights of the accused
might be affected, the court in Tinson decided that
one faced with parole revocation had a constitutional right to counsel when sentence is imposed at
trial but execution deferred, as well as where the
sentencing itself is deferred. The Gargancourt, also
relying on Mempa, held that the right to counsel
extended to a probation revocation hearing before
the imposition of sentence.
Constitutional Limit Of Use Of Prior Recorded
Testimony Examined-The United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of Washington
recently have addressed themselves to the extent
of the state's duty to present a witness at trial before using his prior testimony in a subsequent trial.
In Berger v. California, 80 S. Ct. 540 (1969), the
Supreme Court in a per curium decision gave Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 20 (1968), retroactive effect.
In Berger the victim of a robbery and kidnapping
testified against the defendant at a preliminary
hearing. At the time of the trial he was absent from
the jurisdiction, being in Colorado. The California
prosecutor wired him asking that he testify but
did not subpoena him. At trial, when the victim
did not appear, the transcript of the preliminary
hearing was introduced instead.
The California Appellate Court held that this did
not violate the defendant's right to confront
witnesses. The California Supreme Court denied
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the defendant's petition for a hearing. Nineteen
days later the United States Supreme Court held
in Barber that absence of a witness from a jurisdiction does not justify the use of pre-trial hearing
testimony unless the state makes a good faith effort
to secure the witness's testimony.
The Supreme Court held that Barber should be
given retroactive effect since its holding had clearly
been forshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 85 S. Ct.
1065 (1965). The Court said one of the objects of
the right of confrontation is to insure that the fact
finder has occasion to assess a witness's credibility.
In the present case the state failed to make the
required effort to provide this confrontation and
thus the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
Upon different facts the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Roebuck, 448 P.2d 934 (Wash.
1968), held that the lower court was justified in
using prior testimony. In this case the elderly
victim of the defendant's alleged assault testified in a
District Justice Court, that the defendant had
knocked him down and attempted to rob him. The
defendant was provided with court appointed
counsel shortly before the hearing. His attorney did
not cross-examine the victim at this time.
At trial the victim was found to no longer possess
testamentary capacity. Because of this and because
the Justice Court was not a court of record, the
judge and an arresting officer present at the hearing
were called to testify as to the contents of the
victim's prior testimony. Defendant objected. The
Washington Supreme Court held that admission
of the testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. It said such testimony
was admissible when the witness 1) is unavailable,
2) was sworn to testify in a previous trial, and 3) if
the accused was present and afforded opportunity
to cross-examine, and 4) if the person who related
the testimony was present and can state what was
said.
The court found no difficulty with the fact that
the previous testimony was not recorded or the
fact that it was given in the atmosphere of a
preliminary hearing, not a trial. It dismissed the
defendant's objection that defense counsel did not
actually cross-examine, saying the exercise of the
right is irrelevant as long as the right itself is
present. If it was true that counsel was unprepared
the court said that counsel should have asked for a
continuance.
The court said the determination of the victim's
unavailability was within the trial court's discre-
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tion. Apparently neither the trial court nor the supreme court was concerned with the permanance or
probable duration of the victim's incompentency.
Finally, the court held that the right of confrontation does not include a right to have the jury
observe the demeanor of the witness where he is
truly unavailable and held that Barber v. Page
applied only to available witnesses.
Redactions Fail To Save Co-defendant Confession From Sixth Amendment Attack-Two recent
cases, both from New York, have found that the
use of a co-defendant's confession inculpating a
fellow defendant violated the Sixth Amendment.
In United States ex. rel. LaBelle v. Mancusi, 404
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit reversed, on a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner's
conviction for a rape-murder of a 15 year old girl.
The petitioner and his brother were co-defendants.
Neither testified at trial. A considerable body of
evidence was introduced which placed the two
together and with the victim the night of the
crime. Petitioner's brother's confession was read
into the record after redactions were made; that is,
after deletions of references to the co-defendant
by name.
Petitioner argued that even as redacted the
statements were so inculpatory as to require
reversal as a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
even though the jury was charged that the statements were not evidence against the petitioner.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The
court of appeals agreed and held that in such a
coercive case a remand to the state courts to permit
them to decide if the statements were inculpatory,
would serve no purpose but to delay the necessary
new trial.
In People v. Baker, 244 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1968)
the New York Court of Appeals spoke to the same
problem in reversing the conviction of a group of
teenagers for the robbery-slaying of the wife of a
clothing store owner in Manhattan. Originally
seven youths planned to go to the store, stab the
deceased and her husband and then steal several
suits of clothes. While going to the crime one of the
boys, Robert Barnes, was stopped by his father to
discuss another matter, and thus kept from participating in the crime. He was later arrested by the
police, confessed his part in the crime and later
testified. The other six were found guilty, of the
first degree murder of Mrs. Sugar and the at-

tempted murder of Mr. Sugar, robbery, and
attempted robbery.
The defendants appealed on the ground that
both Barnes and Detective Gonzales testified that
some of the defendants made statements inculpating other co-defendants. None of these defendants
themselves testified. The court reluctantly held
that while the defendants's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, this testimony, without
any attempt to redact it, violated the defendants's
right to confront their accusers. Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123,134 (1968).
The fact that there was no objection was irrelevant since in this pre-Brut on case their admission under limiting instructions was proper. Moreover, the prosecution vitiated the effect of any
instruction by arguing over objection in closing
argument that the jury should consider one of the
defendant's statements against the others.
Moreover, redactions made in written statements obtained from three of the defendants were
held to be insufficient to remove their inculpatory
character as to others. The court held that none
of these could be effectively redacted, thereby
requiring the prosecution to forego their use or try
the defendants separately.
Prosecution Must Give Defendants Name Of
Informer-Honore v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969). Defendant
Honore was in police custody from 5:30 a.m. to
7:30 p.m. on February 18, 1968, on a charge unrelated to the instant case. About 3 p.m. a reliable
informer contacted a police officer and told him
Honore probably had been selling methedrine. By
that evening the informer visited defendant
Honore's apartment and he later told the officer
that four other persons were there and that
methedrine was present. A warrant was issued
authorizing a search of defendant's apartment for
dangerous drugs and at 1:30 a.m. on February 19
the police entered the apartment and found
marijuana. At trial defendants moved to compel
disclosure of the informer's identity. The trial
court sustained prosecution's claim of privilege
under section 1041 of the Evidence Code, which
provides that there shall not be disclosure if such is
"against the public interest because there is a
necessity for preserving the confidentiality of [the
informer's] identity that outweighs the necessity
for disclosure in the interest of justice. . ".
The California Supreme Court reversed, directing the trial court to order disclosure. Defendants
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asserted that they did not bring marijuana into the
apartment and that the informer would be able to
testify who had marijuana and how it got into the
apartment. The court concluded that such a contention satisfied defendants' burden of showing
that the informer would be a material witness on
the issue of guilt and that nondisclosure would
deprive the defendants of a fair trial. Their burden
did not, however, extend to showing that the
informer's testimony would be favorable to them
or that he was an eyewitness to or participant in the
crime. Since defendant Honore was in police
custody for 14 hours, during which time the informer visited her apartment, the court concluded
that defendants might not have "exercised that
degree of dominion and control over the marijuana
required to sustain a conviction for possession"
and that the informer's testimony as to the identity
and activities of the four persons in the apartment
during defendant Honore's custody might result
in the defendants' exoneration.
Sentencing After Retrial-United States v.
Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). The defendant
had been convicted of violating narcotic laws. His
conviction was reversed, but he was again convicted at the retrial. The sentence imposed at the
retrial was more severe than the sentence at his
original trial. The court said that the policy of
double jeopardy is not offended when, as a consequence of a retrial of the same offense resulting
from proceedings taken by the accused to correct
trial error, a higher punishment is imposed. The
court recognized various types of reasons which
would justify a higher sentence after retrial; for
instance, where the defendant has engaged in antisocial activities after his first sentence, or where the
new trial reveals that the crime was more dastardly
or that the defendant played a larger role than was
first supposed.
The court believed that the U.S. Constitution
did not prohibit higher sentences after retrial for
the same offense, but that the prospect of an increased sentence was sufficiently threatening to
the assertion of defendants' rights that the practice
should be limited to cases truly calling for it. The
imposition of more severe sentences after retrial
should be limited to cases where it is justified by
conduct of the accused subsequent to the original
trial, or facts aggravating the crime which were
not known at the first trial.
Prison Term For Non-payment Of Fine Not
Unconstitutional-State v. Allen, 249 A.2d 70 (N.J.
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Super. 1969). After serving less than half of his
sentence, petitioner's application for parole was
accepted, but the parole board insisted that he
pay one-third of the fine levied at sentencing before release. The petitioner argued that his confinement to work off the fine at five dollars a day
because of his inability to pay violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court refused to hold
unconstitutional the practice of imprisonment for
non-payment of a fine where the additional deprivation of liberty did not exceed the statutory
maximum fixed for the particular crime.
A dissenting judge refused to draw a distinction
between a resulting term greater or less than the
statutory maximum. He argued that the reasoning
of the majority was flawed. The parole board had
made a reasoned determination that no additional
confinement was needed either for the protection
of the community or the rehabilitation of the
petitioner. Since the object of imprisonment for
failure to pay a fine is to compel payment, it is
equally arbitrary to incarcerate one not able to pay
the fine where such imprisonment will not carry
the total term flowing from the sentence beyond
the statutory maximum as in the instance where it
will. The poor criminal is given additional imprisonment solely because of his poverty in either
case.
MISCELLANEOUS

State Prison Ban Of Jailhouse Lawyers Held
Invalid-Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969).
Petitioner, a prisoner in the Tennessee State
Penitentiary, had violated a prison regulation by
aiding fellow prisoners in the preparation of Writs
and other legal papers. This action arose out of his
prayer for relief from the disciplinary confinement
to which he was sentenced due to the violation.
The district court held the regulation invalid because it denied illiterate prisoners access to federal
habeas corpus. But the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed. It ruled that the State's
interest in preserving prison discipline and in
limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys
outweighed the prisoners' privilege to access to
federal habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.
Justice Fortas wrote for the majority which concluded that ". . . unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates
in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction
relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such
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as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners". Since there
is no obligation to appoint counsel for prisoners
seeking post conviction relief, the inmate is denied
access to the courts unless he can obtain adequate
aid elsewhere. Even though the jailhouse lawyer
system can be disruptive and can result in unskillfully drawn, time-consuming petitions, the
practice cannot be barred unless Tennessee
provides an "available alternative".
The Court mentioned but did not evaluate
several alternative procedures practiced in other
jurisdictions. These included aid by law students,
by a public defender system, and by local bar
associations. However, even without such procedures the state would be allowed to regulate
some aspects of the practice. It could either limit
the time and location of such aid or could punish
those accepting consideration for their services.
But there must be a "regular system of assistance"
before regulations totally prohibiting the practice
could be tolerated.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred and premised his
arguments on the increasingly difficult time
men are having in trying to communicate with the
overwhelming body of government agencies. Believing that the prisoner's plight is more acute than
that of the average layman, he called for programs
to satisfy the demands for prisoner legal aid. Laymen trained in different facets of procedure could
handle many of the prisoners' problems. This would
relieve pressure on the bar, allow for prison regulation and discipline of jailhouse lawyers, and present
adequate opportunity for aid in seeking -postconviction relief. The only alternative to this
assistance would be the continued practice of
jailhouse lawyers because 1) of the necessity of
some post-conviction review, and 2) of the theraputic benefits that the practice afforded by relieving anxieties created by a situation where aid was
not readily available.
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
dissented because ".... unless the help the indigent gets from other inmates is reasonably adequate for the task, he will be as surely and effectively barred from the courts as if he were accorded
no help at all". The alternatives to the dissent
consisted of professional help appointed in a case
by case proceeding, or of regulated lay trustees
who need not be licensed attorneys. Lastly, the
dissent suggested a statute which would set
minimum standards and conditions for jailhouse

lawyers if they are to continue in business. To it
there was no protection to the prisoner client's
rights through the present system.
Anti-War Demonstrators' Convictions For Trespass And Breach-Of-Peace Reversed-People v.
Harrison, 163 N. W. 2d 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968);
State v. Johnson, 163 N. W. 2d 750 (Minn. 1968).
In the first case, the defendants entered the
Michigan State University student union building
during a "career carnival". Carrying anti-war
signs and posters, they positioned themselves near
a U.S. Marine Corps recruiting booth and passed
out literature which opposed the American
military activities in Vietnam. At all times they
were polite and cooperative. At the request of
several of the participants in the "career carnival",
a university official told the protesters to move
their signs and materials outside, after which
they would be as welcome as any other student or
guest to view the displays of this "career carnival"
as long as their activities are lawful and orderly.
When they failed to comply, university police
officers arrested them.
Convicted under Michigan's trespass-afterwarning statute and the university's non-obstruction ordinance, they appealed and their convictions were reversed. The court pointed out that the
individuals were not requested to depart from
university ground, but just to remove their signs
and materials. Thus, the demonstrators were not
trespassers within the scope of the statute.
Furthermore, their activities did not constitute
unlawful obstruction in light of the fact that the
union was already heavily congested and the
demonstrators were quick to move out of the way
whenever requested to do so.
In the second case of the above two cases, State v.
Johnson, the anti-war defendants were convicted
under a Minneapolis city ordinance which prohibits "conduct which disturbs the peace and quiet
of another", (Minneapolis Code of Ordinances,
§870.060.) They had gathered on a downtown
street comer and addressed passersby from a step
ladder with the aid of a portable microphone.
Fifteen minutes after a crowd of about 200 had
gathered, the police, in a polite and courteous
manner, arrested the protestors for violating city
ordinance §872.040, which requires the display of
the American flag at all public gatherings (which
ordinance was held unconstitutional by the trial
court), and for breach of the peace.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
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refused to hold the breach-of-the-peace ordinance
unconstitutional for vagueness. The conviction was
reversed, however, on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence to prove the misconduct of the
individual defendants. Mere evidence of wrongful
conduct by the defendants as a group cannot
support the convictions of the individual members
of that group.
New Jersey Upholds State Gun Control LawBurton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968). In
Burton the plaintiffs, gun dealers and individuals
associated with sportsmen's clubs, sought to have
New Jersey's recently enacted gun control law
declared unconstitutional and to enjoin its
enforcement. The statute prohibits the sale of
firearms to those without an identification card
issued by the local police. This card shall not be
issued to those in certain groups, including minors
under eighteen, convicted criminals, mental
'defectives, addicts, etc. It also provides that such
a permit not be issued to any person where the
issuance would not be in the interest of the public
health, safety or welfare. The lower courts upheld
the statute against the plaintiffs' charges that it
delegated broad powers without sufficient legisla.ive direction or specification and that it was
basically unconsitutional.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey -affirmed.
The court passed quickly over the unlawful
delegation of powers argument, noting the
statutory provisions providing for an early
determination by an easy appeal to the courts and
commenting that the statutory terms are under-
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standable and comparable to those used in many
other New Jersey statutes.
The plaintiffs' first assertion of unconstitutionality was that the statute failed in its alleged
purpose and therefore must "fall under the
weight of the private rights it infringes upon".
The court, however, refused to consider the
wisdom of the legislative judgment and passed on to
plaintiffs' contention that the statute infringes
the Second Amendment right of the people to
bear arms. The plaintiffs' further argued that the
Second Amendment will be applied to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The New
Jersey court found it unnecessary to consider this
last assertion as it concluded that the statute did
not impair the maintenance of the State's active,
organized militia and found that it was this
impairment, not the right of the private individual,
to which the Second Amendment was addressed to.
- In addition the plaintiffs' claimed that the
statutory requirements were. excessively onerous
and that the disclosure requirements violated the
privilege against self-incrimination. The court
found that this last argument, based on Haynes v.
.UnitedStates, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), was inapplicable
because in Haynes -the disclosure provisions were
directed at a "highiy--selective group inherently
suspect of criminal -activities" while that was not
the case in the New Jersey gun control statute.
Finally, the court found the inconvenience to the
plaintiffs in complying with the requirements of
the statute clearly outweighed by the state's
paramount interest in gun control.
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CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGROUS-

Compiled and
Edited by Jonas R. Rappeport, M.D. Charles C
Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1967. Pp. xviii,
118. $6.50.
This book is essentially a transcription of a panel
discussion on this subject at the annual meeting of
the American Psychiatric Association in May,
1965. There are also included some additional and
valuable contributions, not the least of which is a
review of the psychiatric literature on this subject.
It is of definite medical interest, although quite
loaded with the usual pat Freudian interpretations
regarding cause and motivation. This reviewer
believes the most important information in this
book for the police officer is that, as of this moment,
psychiatrists cannot predict the potential dangerESS OF THE M-ENTALLY ILL.

ousness of most individuals. Furthermore, he cannot do this any better than, and often not as well
as, an experienced police officer or judge. The
physicians try, and they are genuinely concerned,
but there are too many gaps in their knowledge for
their own complacence. Some things they do know,
and in these areas their experience is helpful, but,
after all, as with a race horse, it is past performance
that determines the odds. If you get it for your
police library, do not expect as much as might be
suggested by the title.
-WLA
K. KELLR, M.D.
Professor and Chairman
Department of Psychiatry
University of Louisville Medical School

